Ideological biases in social sharing of online information about climate change by Cann, TJB et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Ideological biases in social sharing of online
information about climate change
Tristan J. B. CannID*, Iain S. Weaver, Hywel T. P. Williams
Department of Computer Science, University of Exeter, Exeter, Devon, United Kingdom
* tc471@exeter.ac.uk
Abstract
Exposure to media content is an important component of opinion formation around climate
change. Online social media such as Twitter, the focus of this study, provide an avenue to
study public engagement and digital media dissemination related to climate change. Shar-
ing a link to an online article is an indicator of media engagement. Aggregated link-sharing
forms a network structure which maps collective media engagement by the user population.
Here we construct bipartite networks linking Twitter users to the web pages they shared,
using a dataset of approximately 5.3 million English-language tweets by almost 2 million
users during an eventful seven-week period centred on the announcement of the US with-
drawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change. Community detection indicates that
the observed information-sharing network can be partitioned into two weakly connected
components, representing subsets of articles shared by a group of users. We characterise
these partitions through analysis of web domains and text content from shared articles, find-
ing them to be broadly described as a left-wing/environmentalist group and a right-wing/cli-
mate sceptic group. Correlation analysis shows a striking positive association between left/
right political ideology and environmentalist/sceptic climate ideology respectively. Looking
at information-sharing over time, there is considerable turnover in the engaged user popula-
tion and the articles that are shared, but the web domain sources and polarised network
structure are relatively persistent. This study provides evidence that online sharing of news
media content related to climate change is both polarised and politicised, with implications
for opinion dynamics and public debate around this important societal challenge.
Introduction
In spite of scientific consensus on the causes and primary effects of climate change, it remains
a controversial topic in public and political discourse. Surveys have long shown substantial
variation in public beliefs around climate change (for example [1, 2]) and the level of polarisa-
tion between individuals supporting and opposing action to mitigate anthropogenic climate
change has been growing [3]. Media coverage of climate science and the frames used to present
the information can have an important impact on public perceptions and willingness to take
action [4], present different motivations and calls for action [5] and influence the accuracy and
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longevity of reproduced messages [6]. Recent work has shown that media effects vary depend-
ing on existing political biases [7]. Understanding the media landscape around climate change
is of key importance in mapping public engagement with the issue and support for political
actions to confront it.
Assessing which people are exposed to what information is fundamental to any study of the
effects of media on public understanding and opinion. The disruptive impact of online media
has transformed the media environment, radically altering the diversity of content people
encounter as well as the exposure process itself. Individuals are faced with a wide range of
media options (both social and traditional), new patterns of exposure (selected by the end user
or driven by their social network) and increased production of user-generated content [8].
Previous work in this area has focused on the effects of incidental exposure on media aware-
ness (e.g. [9]) and the diversity presented by online recommender systems (e.g. [10]). Such
efforts are hampered by the diversity of online platforms, the rapid pace of their development
and the obfuscation of the algorithmic processes they follow, and as a result no universal
understanding of exposure effects is possible. Whether an individual is consuming the news
online from a legacy media organisation, or producing and consuming information on social
media, the fundamental dynamic of communication exposure and influence is that of network
formation [11], based on creation of new relationships between users and media content by a
variety of means (such as web-browsing and social information-sharing). Online media expo-
sure creates a network that links sources and consumers of content (nodes) via their interac-
tions (edges), requiring a network perspective for its proper understanding.
This study aims to describe patterns of sharing online media content about climate change.
While a complete record of users’ exposure to digital content is only possible via accurate
tracking of web browsing histories, media engagement can be inferred from the content users
share on social media. Sharing a web article requires action by the user, and causes it to appear
on the social media feeds of friends and followers, as well as contributing to aggregate trends,
often advertised by social media platforms. This is used to indicate a significantly higher level
of engagement than exposure. Social sharing of content instantiates a promotion mechanism,
increasing the visibility of any content across a user’s social network and likely indicating that
the sharer agrees with, or approves of, the content. These factors, along with the increasing use
of social media as a source of news [12], mean that study of digital media sharing can provide
insights into how information is propagated online, including important contemporary issues
like climate change. In particular, Weaver et al. [13] shows that network analysis of such prop-
agation patterns can reveal meaningful social structures of news engagement and consumption
around political events.
Here we operationalise our study of online information-sharing around climate change by
examining link-sharing on Twitter. User posts (tweets) referencing climate change and con-
taining links to web content (URLs, which are often rendered into news blurbs or images in
the Twitter client) were collected from the Twitter social media platform via its public API.
This dataset was used to construct bipartite networks linking users to the digital media they
shared. Analysis of network topology finds strong community structure, supplemented by
comparison of source domains and textual content of articles shared within each community.
Exploration of detected communities identifies strong ideological polarisation within the
news-sharing network where users are segregated by divergent opinions, rather than an ongo-
ing process, an alternative definition which is important in other contexts [14]. Overall the
results indicate highly polarised and politicised engagement with web content around climate
change, with largely segregated and ideologically biased communities receiving information
from different media sources. We demonstrate that the observed correlation between political
views and climate change beliefs (e.g. [3]) extends to online information sources and their
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shared readerships. For the first time, we track network structure over a 7-week period, includ-
ing a disruptive media event (the announcement of the withdrawal of the USA from the Paris
Agreement on climate change), to show the persistence of the observed polarisation and politi-
cisation of media sharing related to climate change over time and with varying background
levels of public interest.
Social media data has been used to study several aspects of public opinion around climate
change, including attitudes towards and engagement with climate change mitigation strategies
[15], media framing of the leaked “Climategate” emails on YouTube [5], and the spreading of
calls for collective action at the COP15 conference [16]. Networks are an intuitive representa-
tion, and come with a host of analytical tools to understand the shape of online discussions
around climate change; for example Elgesem et al. [17] explore the network of hyperlinks
between blogs, while Williams et al. [18] study the structure of follower, retweet and mention
networks on Twitter. In both of these studies, user communities manifest as densely intercon-
nected clusters with similar characteristics. These communities are highly polarised, such that
each community is well described by a single viewpoint, with few moderate voices. Similar pat-
terns have also been observed for online political discourse (e.g. [19–24]). This pattern of opin-
ion polarisation and segregation has important implications for opinion change and the
likelihood of global consensus [25]. Polarisation in online social media is most frequently stud-
ied in the political sphere, especially for two-party political systems with an ideological split
along a left-right axis. However, the phenomenon also extends to the competing opinions
around climate change, which are often simplified as a debate between environmentalists (sup-
porting the scientific consensus and promoting action) and sceptics (doubting or opposing the
consensus and need for action), notwithstanding the diversity of viewpoints and representa-
tions of this complex issue [26]. These previous network-based studies generally treat datasets
as single snapshots, along with the implicit assumption that the phenomena under study varies
slowly. The intervals studied range from months to years, but by choosing such a timescale it is
possible to overlook the changes that social networks can experience in shorter periods.
The pattern of polarisation in both political and climate change contexts is often associated
with the existence of echo chambers in the social media ecosystem, whereby users choose to
associate with people and news-media sources which conform to and reinforce their existing
beliefs [18]. Echo chambers have been proposed to contribute to the spreading of misinforma-
tion [27], political networks of environmental actors [28], exposure to political information on
social media [21], and online content around climate change (e.g. [17, 18, 29]). In this work we
focus on the structural phenomenon of echo chambers but other scholars have looked at how
they are linked to psychological processes such as confirmation bias (e.g. [30]).
Previous studies of information-sharing around climate change have focused on the promi-
nence of different sources. Newman [31] analysed the tweets and information sources shared
alongside the release of the IPCC AR5 WG1 report, finding a focus on the public engagement
with science, and a dominance of mainstream media sources. Segerberg and Bennett [16]
examined the breakdown of different link sources used alongside calls to collective action at
the COP15 conference. Kirilenko and Stepchenkova [32] studied the URLs shared on Twitter
over the course of one year in five different languages, finding that by country, the US domi-
nated total tweet counts, and a mix of traditional media, activist and sceptic sites were shared.
Polarisation is a common observation in the climate change debate. Notable studies such as
Dunlap et al. [3] have shown that the polarisation effect in climate change opinion has grown
between 1997 and 2016. An impact of polarisation can be observed in the frames used to dis-
cuss climate change, such as by Jang and Hart [33], who analysed the themes present in Twit-
ter’s climate change debate across two years. They found differences in the terminology used
by opposing groups, with Republican-leaning states in the US using global warming in
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preference to climate change, and often using hoax frames to cast doubt on the scientific con-
sensus. O’Neill et al. [34] found that this trend extended to the media coverage of the publica-
tion of the IPCC AR5 working group reports. By studying the frames used in newspaper and
television broadcasts, they found clear preferences for different frames amongst the various
news organisations. Some work has looked at countering the growing levels of polarisation,
including Zhang et al. [7] who study the effect of clarifying messages on accuracy over the per-
ceived levels of consensus among climate scientists. Among their experimental group, expo-
sure to the clarifying message lead to more uniform accuracy around the scientific consensus
through greater impact in the areas of lower baseline belief.
The effects of polarisation do not always manifest equally on each end of the opinion spec-
trum. Schuldt et al. [35] compared the usage of the terms climate change and global warming
across the websites of a series of think tanks. Right-wing think tanks were more likely to use
global warming, with the opposite trend observed in left-wing think tanks. These findings of
content differences from polarised sources extends beyond the climate change debate. Further
analysis of climate sceptic organisations and their funding sources by Farrell [36] found shared
sources of funding across many of them. Beyond the topic of climate change, Freelon et al.
[37] present an overview of how the different online activism strategies of left- and right-wing
groups manifest different types of content and audiences. They highlight a key difference in
the perceived strategies of the different groups. Left-wing groups target “hashtag activism”
leading to social promotion of movements whereas right-wing groups engage much more
readily with sympathetic media organisations to promote their messages and goals. Freelon
et al. also recognise a similar trend in group coherence where right-wing groups are tighter
when compared to left-wing groups formed from a loose coalition of multiple issue-led groups.
Considering this coordinated funding of multiple groups and engagement with media organi-
sations, it is to be expected that climate sceptic messaging is likely to be more consistent than
competing environmentalist information.
Along with climate change, studies of information-sharing on social media have embraced
a diversity of different topics; Starbird [38] studied the spread of misinformation around mass
shooting events in the United States, finding a cluster of alternative news sites separate from
mainstream media sources. Arif et al. [39] and Del Vicario et al. [27] study the spreading
behaviour of rumours and misinformation on Twitter and Facebook respectively and classify
observed trends. Schmidt et al. [40] analyse a network of news-related pages on Facebook,
where two pages are connected if they have posts that are liked or commented on by the same
user. Their cluster analysis reveals a highly polarised structure, as seen in a number of other
contexts (e.g. [19]). Williams et al. [41] also study the community structure of political news-
sharing via Twitter, finding communities characterised by both geographical and political fac-
tors. Weaver et al. [13] examined information-sharing on Twitter during the UK General Elec-
tion in 2015, showing strong community structure explained by ideological, geographical and
topical preferences. Each of these studies should be considered in the context of the typical
sharer and the information they are exposed to. Not all users on social media are exposed to
the same information, and typically they are exposed to information in which they have
already shown an interest through their own decisions of which users to follow, along with
algorithmic filtering effects. Sharing information requires action on the user’s part and as such
those who choose to share are likely part of a more highly invested subset of the users exposed
to a certain piece of information.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section Methods details the method of data collec-
tion and preparation, along with the techniques used to construct and analyse the informa-
tion-sharing networks. Our main results follow in Section Results, including network analysis
and characterisation of community structures, and finally Section Discussion provides a
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thorough discussion of the main findings of this study and places them in the wider context of
media effects on the climate change debate. Additional data and visualisations can be found in
the S1 File.
Methods
Tweet collection and pre-processing
This analysis uses seven weeks of Twitter data collected from the Streaming API [42]. Tweets
containing the strings climate change or global warming were collected between 2017-05-10
and 2017-06-27, giving an initial dataset of 5, 320, 400 tweets by 1, 975, 593 users. Inspection
suggests that most of the content comes from the US and the UK.
The collection period captures a key event in the unfolding climate change narrative, the
announcement on 1st June 2017 by then-US President Donald Trump that the USA would
withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change mitigation. This event caused a large
spike of activity on Twitter around the topic of climate change illustrated by S1 Fig in S1 File.
To study this event in the context of a longer period of “normal” activity, the collection spans
seven weeks centred on the week of greatest activity. We separate the dataset into seven one-
week intervals to account for the potential weekly periodicity in social media usage and gives
sufficient sampling density for robust network analyses.
This study focuses on the digital media engagement and sharing behaviour of Twitter users
discussing climate change. To capture this behaviour, the dataset is filtered to remove all
retweets (where a user reposts an original tweet) and quotes (where a user reposts an original
tweet with their own commentary prepended). The purpose of this filter is to focus on original
tweets, which are assumed to be the strongest available measure of user engagement with con-
tent; the low effort cost of retweeting and quoting means that user engagement cannot be
inferred as clearly from these tweet types. The remaining tweets are further filtered to retain
only those which contain an embedded link (URL) to web content. These links are the digital
media items shared by the tweet author, including news articles, blog posts, videos and other
content. Such tweets can be composed by manual insertion of a link or clicking the ‘share’ but-
ton often presented alongside online news content. Application of all the filters leaves a dataset
of 592, 830 tweets containing URLs by 195, 134 users, broken down over the 7-week study
period in Table 1. Most notably, the centre point of the dataset in week 4 includes the US inten-
tion to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, producing a dramatic surge in Twitter activity.
URL validation
Every URL found in the tweet dataset was validated in December 2017 to ensure that it was a
working link to an identifiable item of online content. This validation step was necessary for a
Table 1. Weekly tweets and unique users in our filtered dataset. Week 4, in which the Paris Agreement announce-
ment was made, includes many more tweets than any other week, accounting for 35% of all the tweets studied.
Week Original Tweets Unique users
1 52, 737 27, 499
2 60, 922 31, 769
3 78, 353 38, 683
4 209, 637 96, 506
5 67, 234 36, 620
6 65, 248 34, 625
7 58, 699 28, 536
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250656.t001
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number of reasons. Firstly, each URL must be accessible to allow subsequent analysis of con-
tent. Secondly, typographical errors by tweet authors are sometimes incorrectly interpreted by
the Twitter API as URLs, such as periods followed by alphanumeric characters (hello.world).
Thirdly, the validation process handles shortened URLs, which represent the majority of URLs
in tweets. Many Twitter users make use of third-party URL shorteners, services which create a
redirect to a given long URL from a shorter version that can then be used to reduce the charac-
ters needed to embed URL in a tweet (this is unnecessary since Twitter includes its own short-
ening service that reduces any URL to 23 characters). URL shorteners are also sometimes used
to conceal the target URL from anyone who may potentially click on it. These short links must
be traced to their destination both to ensure they point ultimately to a valid resource, and also
to be treated alongside other links to the same destination.
Each URL is resolved individually, marking as valid only those that return HTTP status
code 2XX immediately or through a small number of permanent redirects (301! 301! . . .
! 2XX status codes). The 2XX status codes indicate various successful outcomes to an HTTP
request.
Many valid URLs included modifiers inserted for tracking and metadata purposes, without
altering the destination page. This can lead to many URLs pointing to the same resource, so to
minimise the possibility of considering these as distinct URLs, all schemes and queries are
removed from the resolved URLs. A small number of domains were adversely affected by this.
YouTube and other Google services were the most prominent, largely due to the structure of
their links. As a result, our process does not distinguish between different YouTube videos
within the networks.
The validation process results in a mapping between each raw URL (as given in a tweet)
and the validated final destination after any acceptable redirect paths. Any tweet containing at
least one unvalidated URL is removed from the dataset. Finally, all users who tweeted more
than 50 times within a given week are removed; this threshold is found to be a sensible limit to
mitigate the impact of automated accounts, especially news aggregator accounts. Across the
seven weeks 271 unique accounts were affected, leading to the removal of 66, 892 tweets
(approximately 1% of the total dataset). This left 245, 446 tweets by 113, 154 users sharing 54,
462 distinct, validated, URLs across all of the seven one-week windows.
Network construction
Bipartite networks, containing two node classes representing users and URLs, are constructed
by creating an edge i! j whenever user i shares URL j, illustrated by Fig 1. Multiple shares of
URL j by user i increment the edge weight so that the final bipartite edge weight w(i, j) repre-
sents the number of times user i shared URL j.
Next a unipartite projection is produced from the bipartite network, whereby a network of
only URL nodes is created, where edges encode the number of users that shared the connected
pair of URLs. The network construction process is illustrated in Fig 1. The URLs shared by a
single user (Fig 1a) form a fully connected clique of nodes representing the sharing pattern for
that user (Fig 1b). The whole unipartite network is then constructed by composing the cliques
for all users (Fig 1c). The projection allows the use of efficient unipartite network analysis algo-
rithms and focuses the analysis on the relationships between URLs. The unipartite network of
URLs represents the collective pattern of sharing online content of the targeted Twitter user
population. Statistics for the seven one-week networks created are given in S1 Table in S1 File.
We restrict our analyses to the giant component to avoid the issue of network fragmenta-
tion and limit its impact on community detection. In all cases the giant component consists of
around two thirds of all URL nodes in the network. One important design decision made in
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this process is how user shares are encoded into unipartite edge weight; different weighting
schemes significantly impact the performance of community detection algorithms. User con-
tributions to unipartite edge weights are scaled by the factor 1/(ki − 1), where ki is the total
number of article shares by user i (including repeated links), such that the total unipartite edge
weight contribution by each user is ki/2 (as proposed in Newman [43]). This hyperbolic
weighting scheme was found to allow robust recovery of community structures after projec-
tion [44]. Without this weighting factor, a user’s edge weight contribution to the projected net-
work is quadratic in the number of URLs shared, since each user creates ki(ki − 1)/2 edges in
the projection, causing users who share many articles to quickly dominate the network and
subsequent analysis.
Computing the projection requires knowledge of the biadjacency matrix B of the giant
component, where the rows represent users and the columns represent URLs; and a diagonal
matrix D such that Dii = 1/(ki − 1). Given these matrices, the adjacency matrix for the weighted








Fig 1. Schematic diagram of the bipartite network construction and unipartite projection. Each user is connected to the URLs they share in
the study week. The unipartite projection creates edges between two URLs whenever they are shared by the same person. Multiple edges in the
projection indicate that multiple users have shared the pair of URLs, and this information is tracked by edge weights. A user’s edge contribution
to the projection increases quadratically with the number of URLs they share, potentially leading to a dominance of highly active users in the
unipartite projection, for example User 3 (red) in the projection; this is handled by a hyperbolic weighting scheme (see Section Network
construction).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250656.g001
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Community detection
Community detection was used to find clusters of densely interconnected nodes in the net-
work, which in this context represent sets of URLs which were seen by a group of similar Twit-
ter users. Community detection [45] is a means of algorithmically identifying such clusters in
a given unipartite network. This study used a greedy algorithm proposed by Clauset et al. [46]
that partitions nodes into communities such that the modularity of the partition is optimised;
modularity measures the proportion of edges within communities relative to the proportion of
edges between communities. If a community assignment is significantly better than random, a
modularity score between 0.3 and 0.7 is typically observed [45]. Modularity scores for each
network are given in S1 Table in S1 File.
Content analysis
Page content was collected for each validated URL using Diffbot [47], an online service for
extracting the constituent parts of an HTML document and presenting them in an easily ana-
lysed format. In some cases, Diffbot only identifies the title and cannot automatically detect
the content of a webpage. To mitigate the impact of this, the title is used as the page content
for such URLs. This substitution affected less than 5% of the URLs in each week, except Week
4 which required substitution in 5.9% of the URLs. Additionally, a small number of domains
were incompatible with the Diffbot API. This accounts for around 4% of all URLs in the giant
components of any week and mostly arise due to page formatting or timeout issues.
Online content was analysed quantitatively by calculating term frequency-inverse docu-
ment frequency (TF-IDF) scores, treating each URL as a document and the set of all URLs in
the whole network as the corpus. TF-IDF analyses aim to identify distinctive or important
tokens (usually words) in a document, based on their frequency in the document relative to
their frequency across the corpus. Three kinds of token were studied in this way, in three sepa-
rate analyses: web domains, page content unigrams, and page content bigrams. Web domains
were extracted for each URL to permit analysis of the sources of content shared on Twitter.
Words and bigrams (two-word phrases) were extracted from the web pages associated with
each URL to allow large-scale analysis of the topics within the content. Before calculating the
TF-IDF vectors for page content, the Snowball stemmer [48] was applied to each content
token. Each stemmed token is mapped back to the most common token that maps to it for
ease of reading, e.g. if fisher, fished and fishing all appear once and fishes appears twice then
the final representation of these tokens is fishes.
TF-IDF score vectors for each URL are calculated and represent the frequency of tokens in
a document relative to their frequency across the corpus. For token t in document d we have







where n is the number of documents in the corpus, tf(t, d) counts the frequency of t in d and
df(t) counts the number of documents in the corpus which contain t. To characterise each
community found in the sharing network, the TF-IDF vectors for each URL in a community
were summed to obtain aggregate scores. In these community-level comparisons, a high
TF-IDF score for a community means that the given token appears more frequently in the
URLs in this community, when compared to other communities. In each case, tokens which
occur in fewer than 50 URLs, or more than 50% of all URLs in a given week are rejected, such
that very common or very rare tokens are omitted. We also removed a set of common stop-
words including trump, paris and agreement. In principle, n-grams can be studied with any
value of n, but beyond n = 2 token frequency is generally too low to be useful.
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Ideological coding of source domains
To examine ideological positioning of popular source domains along axes of political leaning
(from left/progressive to right/conservative) and climate scepticism (from environmentalist to
sceptic), 62 of the 75 most commonly shared source domains across the entire study period
were manually coded for ideological bias (listed in S4 Table in S1 File). Ideology expressed in
articles from each domain was graded on a three-point scale for political opinion (Left-Neu-
tral-Right) and climate change opinion (Environmentalist-Neutral-Sceptic), with an additional
null rating (Unclear) added to both scales for cases where no clear ideology was seen.
A team of six human coders used this scale to independently score text extracts of articles/
content from the most commonly shared domains. For the 75 domains with the most shares
across the seven-week period, we sampled the page content for five most shared articles (using
Diffbot to extract clean text, as described above). If fewer than five articles from a popular
domain were available in the dataset, then all were included. In some cases, the page formats
were incompatible with the Diffbot API, returning no content for 10 domains (see S4 Table in
S1 File for the excluded domains). We additionally excluded the social media sites Twitter,
Wordpress and Reddit; these do not have editorial control and therefore lack a unified ideologi-
cal position. This left a set of 62 domains to be coded. Each extract consisted of up to three
complete paragraphs (of at least 30 words) from the linked web page text. To limit any subjec-
tivity arising from the coders’ personal perspectives, each extract was anonymised (i.e. source
domain and author information were removed) when presented for coding.
Coders were provided with the following definitions to help make their assessments:
• Left: A left-wing stance can be characterised by the promotion of state benefits and services,
public investment in and regulation of private businesses, increased taxation of corporations
and high earners, and support for workers and trade unions.
• Right: A right-wing stance can be characterised by promoting low taxation and minimising
the interference of government in personal and business lives. Public investment is mini-
mised, in favour of allowing market forces to control growth and provision of services.
• Environmentalist: An environmentalist stance supports the scientific consensus on anthro-
pogenic climate change and promotes immediate action by governments and individuals to
mitigate the future impacts.
• Sceptic: A climate sceptic stance opposes the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate
change. Such opposition varies from questioning the existence or causes of climate change,
to opposing efforts to mitigate its impacts.
Each coder assigned a score to each article extract independently. That is, six coders gener-
ated up to five scores for each of 62 domains (in practice, this amounted to 1698 scores out of a
maximum of 1860, with each domain receiving up to 30 scores). Each article score is an integer
denoting the level of ideological bias the coder observes in that article (-1/0/1 for left/neutral/
right or environmentalist/neutral/sceptic, in order, with unclear scores ignored; see S3
Table in S1 File). The article scores assigned by each coder were then averaged for each domain
to determine an overall domain score for that coder. Each domain score is a real-valued num-
ber in the range [−1, 1]; there are 6 scores for each domain, one from each coder.
Since the assignment of ideological bias is somewhat subjective, we performed an adjust-
ment to the domain scores assigned by each coder. This adjustment normalised each domain
score by subtracting the mean domain score for that coder across all 62 domains, then dividing
by the standard deviation. This process represents domain scores as z-scores and normalised
for subjective bias of individual coders. Finally, we average the normalised domain scores
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across all coders to find a single domain score. This process was applied for both political and
climate change ideology. Since judgment of climate change ideology relies on some knowledge
of climate change (e.g. the scientific consensus) the coders were recruited from the postgradu-
ate research community in sciences at the University of Exeter.
Full results for the coding of each domain are presented in S2 Fig in S1 File. To test the reli-
ability of our coding exercise we compare our grades to the domain assessments by Media
Bias/Fact Check [49] (MBFC), a fact-checking and media bias site. We translate the MBFC rat-
ings to our own scale and apply the same z-score normalisation, then calculated the correlation
of the political bias scores by our coders against those from MBFC for those domains which
have been rated by MBFC. We find strong positive correlation (Pearson’s r = 0.8, p< 10−6,
n = 49) demonstrating that the political coding process is consistent with the expert assess-
ments provide by MBFC. No equivalent external assessments are available for climate change
ideology, but the robust performance of our coding process for political bias gives confidence
in the methodology. See Fig 2a and 2b for the average results across domains and coders for
political and climate change bias respectively.
Comparisons over time
To measure the change in patterns of sharing climate media over time, the pairwise similarity
of the sets of users, articles (URLs) and source domains was calculated for the seven weeks in
the study period. An asymmetric similarity measure is defined to give an indication of persis-
tence between weeks and identify influxes of new participants or content. This expression
compares weeks A and B by the fraction of the users, u, links, l, or domains, d, that appeared in
week A that also appeared in week B. In order to account for the repeated usage common in
online social networks, a measure of how many times a user, URL or domain appears in each











Values of the similarity measure fall within the range [0, 1]. Values approaching 0 signify
that very few of the users (respectively URLs, domains) in week A are also present in week B,
whereas values approaching 1 signify that nearly all of the users (respectively URLs, domains)
in week A are also present in week B. Note that by design SA,B 6¼ SB,A for A 6¼ B in general.
Results
This section divides our results into three main findings. In the first part we focus on Week 4
of the study period, in which the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement was announced, to
demonstrate the broad ideological polarisation observed in the information-sharing networks.
Secondly, we characterise the sub-communities that make up the network, showing that sev-
eral linked left-wing/environmentalist communities co-exist with a single right-wing/sceptic
community. Finally, we look at all seven weeks in the study period to explore how network
structure and polarisation changes over time.
Climate media sharing is polarised and politicised
We begin by characterising the information-sharing network during the central week of the
study period, Week 4, in which the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement was announced.
During this week, 7, 496 URLs were shared by 42, 113 Twitter users. After projection this pro-
duces a unipartite network of 7, 496 URLs connected by 107, 304 edges indicating which pairs
PLOS ONE Ideological biases in social sharing of online information about climate change
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250656 April 23, 2021 10 / 25
of URLs were co-shared. Fig 3 shows the URL co-share network of the five largest communi-
ties by total share count. The layout is determined by the ForceAtlas2 algorithm [50], which
groups densely connected nodes together; visual inspection shows a clear partition into two
large clusters. Algorithmic community detection reveals further partitioning within the larger
cluster of the network, illustrated by the different node colours. By considering the contrasting
structures found by the community detection and network layout algorithms, there is evidence
of multiple layers of structure within the network. Note that the large yellow node separated
Fig 2. Average domain ideological positions assigned by each coder and the overall average across all coders. Values should be thought
of as standard deviations from the mean. Vertical bars indicate ± one standard deviation across the coders.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250656.g002
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from the two main clusters is youtube.com/watch. This node is difficult to interpret as it aggre-
gates many YouTube video links, seemingly from all sides of the debate. We cannot verify this
with our text-based content analysis.
There is a strong correlation between opinions about climate change and political ideology
expressed in shared content. Fig 4 plots the position of the 62 web domains on axes of climate
bias and political bias, based on content of articles coded by the panel. Left-right political ideol-
ogy and environmentalist-sceptic climate opinions are very strongly correlated (Pearson’s
r = 0.86) and very few domains appear in the right-wing/environmentalist and left-wing/scep-
tic quadrants.
Mapping ideologies/opinions associated with web domains onto the information-sharing
network structure shows an association between network position and viewpoint. Fig 5 shows
the network diagram from Fig 3 with URL-node colours altered to show biases in the political/
climate opinions expressed by their web domains. Fig 5a colours the nodes to highlight the
left-right political bias. The left-hand cluster contains predominantly left-wing sites. The right-
hand cluster has a high concentration of right-wing sites, but also has many uncoded sites. A
similar pattern can be seen in Fig 5b, which colours nodes by climate change bias, with the
left-hand cluster predominantly environmentalist and the right-hand cluster containing most
Fig 3. Information-sharing networks are polarised. Plot shows the URL co-sharing network for the week in which the US withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement was announced (Week 4 of the study period). The five largest communities by total share count are displayed
(67.69% of 7, 496 nodes). Communities 1 − 5 are coloured blue, yellow, green, red and purple respectively and node size is proportional
to the square root of total share count. Node placement uses a force-directed algorithm [50] which groups densely connected nodes
together; this layout highlights two large clusters, with four communities on the left and a single community on the right.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250656.g003
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of the sceptic domains. Taken together, these findings demonstrate significant strength of
polarisation and politicisation in information-sharing about climate change on Twitter, with
two large clusters of users and information sources, broadly characterised as a left-wing/envi-
ronmentalist group and a right-wing/sceptic group.
Characterisation of information-sharing communities
The main source domains and indicative content of media articles shared within the five larg-
est communities in Week 4 can be seen in Fig 6, in which the radii of the circles show the rela-
tive sizes of these major communities. Here Communities 1, 3, 4 and 5 are communities
within the left-wing/environmentalist cluster in the information-sharing network, whereas
Community 2 is the single community in the right-wing/sceptic cluster. Fig 6 uses a TF-IDF
weighting scheme for each token, such that the prominent tokens are those that are character-
istic of a particular community when compared to the network as a whole. Source domains are
shown in Fig 6a and content is shown in Fig 6b (unigrams) and Fig 6c (bigrams), to allow a
characterisation of the broad themes in each community in terms of geographic focus, political
or climate science biases and key subjects of interest. Table 2 summarises these communities
using the data from Fig 6.
Looking at source domains (Fig 6a), different geographic and political biases can be
inferred based on earlier analysis of domain ideology. Community 2 features predominantly
right-wing sources, whereas Communities 1 & 3-5 contain content from left-wing sources.
Fig 4. Climate media content is politicised. Mean political ideology (left-to-right) and climate opinion
(environmentalist-to-sceptic) expressed in content from the 62 coded web domains over the six coders (see Ideological
coding of source domains). Point size is proportional to the square root of total share count and lines indicate ± one
standard deviation. Labels are shown for 10 most frequently shared domains in the coded list.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250656.g004
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Fig 5. Network clusters are ideologically biased. The two large clusters within the URL co-sharing network for Week
4 shown with URLs coloured by: (a) the average political bias of their source domain; and (b) the average climate
change bias of their source domain. Red denotes left-wing domains, blue denotes right-wing domains, green denotes
environmentalist domains, orange denotes sceptic domains. White denotes any domain coded as neutral and domains
not coded are in gray.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250656.g005
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Terms such as decision and withdraw in each of the communities show that the Paris Agree-
ment announcement is a major topic of conversation during this seven-day period, even span-
ning the ideological/geographic divisions illustrated by Fig 6a. The left-wing communities are
reasonably similar to each other, while the right-wing community is unique in its mention of
previous US political figures such as Obama and Gore and use of scientific terminology. The
bigrams mostly confirm the findings in Fig 6b, but also highlight differences in terminology,
e.g. greater prominence of global warming in right-wing Community 2. Fig 6 and Table 2 dem-
onstrate that there is variation in the geographic scope of the communities. The most apparent
contrast exists between Community 1, which heavily features UK news sources, and Commu-
nities 2 and 3, which include mostly US sources. The distribution of words and bigrams in Fig
6b and 6c show some topical differences between the four communities in the left-wing cluster.
Communities 3 and 4 include more terms related to the consequences of the decision for the
American people whereas Community 1 is mainly concerned with the international political
Fig 6. Source domains and content of media articles shared within the five largest communities in the information-sharing network.
Tokens in each plot are weighted (using TF-IDF) to make distinctive tokens prominent. Circle size is scaled to indicate the total number of
URL shares within the community. Terms coloured black are the highest weighted terms required to reach 15% of the total weight in a
community. For visual clarity, each stemmed token is represented by the most common token that maps to it (or pair of tokens for bigrams).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250656.g006
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ramifications. These findings suggest greater focus and coherence amongst the right-wing and
climate-sceptic frames and support the findings of [37], with greater fragmentation amongst
the left-wing and environmentalist frames; this may partly reflect the larger size of the left-
wing/environmentalist cluster in the information-sharing network, which permits greater
internal differentiation.
Consistency of network structure over time
To understand the consistency of the polarised information-sharing process over time, the
network structure was examined along with similarity/persistence of the sets of users, source
domains and shared URLs (articles) across all weeks in the study period. Similarity scores are
reported in Table 3. Fig 7 presents the network diagrams of the remaining six weeks in our
study period (Weeks 1 − 3 & 5 − 7).
In each week, a similar division into two clusters is observed in the information-sharing
network, although the specific composition of the users and shared articles that form the net-
work changes substantially over time. The number of communities in the left-hand and right-
hand clusters varies over the weeks and the relative sizes of the different communities also
change. However, each week reveals the same broad pattern of a larger left-wing/environmen-
talist cluster split into several smaller sub-communities, with a smaller right-wing/sceptic clus-
ter, showing that this pattern is not an artefact of the increased activity during Week 4. Taken
together with Fig 3, these results demonstrate that the pattern of network division persists over
time, spanning multiple weeks of ‘normal’ activity and one exceptional week of high media
activity.
Considering the inter-week similarity between user populations and the source domains
and URLs they shared, Table 3 shows the inter-week similarity of unique users, URLs and web-
site domain shares, along with the minimum, mean, maximum and standard deviation of pair-
wise similarity measures. The shared articles in Table 3b show the lowest similarity between
weeks, with a slightly higher similarity between adjacent weeks. Intuitively, the source domains
Table 2. Characterisation of the five largest communities in Week 4.
Community 1 This is the largest community and is dominated by mainstream media outlets, such as The Guardian
and The Independent, mostly from the UK. This community includes mainstream news reporting
and discusses the Paris Agreement on climate change almost exclusively, focusing on the
consequences of President Trump’s decision and any international responses.
Community 2 This community includes many right-wing sources, including alternative news sites such as
Breitbart and The Daily Caller. Social media sites are also prominent in this community as
Facebook, Twitter, and Gab all appear, suggesting that this group captures attempts to use Twitter to
re-share content from other social platforms. Some established media outlets such as The Daily Mail
and Fox News are present, but are less focused in this community than alternative news sites. This
community also discusses the Paris Agreement decision made by President Trump, as well as
certain aspects of climate science. This is the only community to focus on former US politicians
Obama and Gore and the phrase global warming dominates the bigram cloud (Fig 6c).
Community 3 This community consists of many mainstream domains revealing a US focus. The most prominent
domains here are established mainstream media sources such as the Washington Post and New York
Times. As with Community 1, the Paris Agreement on climate change is a key topic of interest.
Community 4 This community includes a number of alternative and smaller news media domains with a mostly
left-wing bias, such as Daily Kos and Mother Jones, amongst established mainstream news sources.
The content here is similar to that of Community 1 and Community 3, but also references then US
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Scott Pruitt and Michigan congressman Tim
Walberg for their comments around climate change.
Community 5 This community is comprised of a mix of social media, news and commentary sites. Again, the Paris
Agreement decision is a focus, with additional framing around global consequences and opinion-
pieces on the decision.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250656.t002
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from which content was shared show higher similarity between weeks in Table 3c. User popu-
lations show limited persistence between weeks, summarised by Table 3a. The overall pattern
is that, from week to week, a limited proportion of the user population and set of source
domains persist, with much lower persistence in the sets of articles that are shared. This is an
interesting finding with respect to the high consistency in the two-cluster network structure
that is reliably observed every week. The lack of persistence in shared URLs may be explained
by the general volatility of news media, where articles typically have a short lifetime (e.g. 2-3
days visibility in online sharing [13]). Moderate persistence of users and sources between
weeks perhaps suggests an active core group who are present each week, with a wider group
who appear less frequently.
A marked difference can be observed in the typical similarity scores for Week 4 and for
other weeks. Lower similarity scores were observed for users, URLs and domains from Week 4
appearing in other weeks, while conversely, higher similarity was observed for users, URLs
and domains from the other six weeks appearing in Week 4. The number of new users, URLs
and domains in Week 4 also shows a stark contrast with other weeks: 70.1% of users, 82.0% of
URLs and 47.9% of domains are unique to Week 4 and not present in any other week. This is
strong evidence that the events of Week 4 appear to have spurred an influx of both social
media participants and digital media sources (users: mean 49.3%, min. 45.6%, max. 51.2%,
Table 3. Similarity scores for users, URLs and domains between each of the seven weeks calculated using Eq (3). Similarity is directional. The similarity given in cell (4,
1) is the proportion of the users/URLs/domains in Week 4 also in seen Week 1. Cool shades indicate values smaller than the mean while warm shades indicate values
greater than the mean.
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 0.29 0.33 0.39 0.25 0.25 0.22
2 0.24 0.30 0.35 0.22 0.24 0.21 min.(S) = 0.084
3 0.19 0.21 0.38 0.20 0.19 0.18 mean.(S) = 0.236
4 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.09 max.(S) = 0.389
5 0.18 0.20 0.25 0.36 0.24 0.21 stdev.(S) = 0.078
6 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.35 0.26 0.25
7 0.20 0.23 0.28 0.36 0.27 0.30
(a) Asymmetric overlap of users.
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.04
2 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.04 min.(S) = 0.022
3 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.05 0.04 0.03 mean.(S) = 0.078
4 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02 max.(S) = 0.193
5 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.19 0.16 0.07 stdev.(S) = 0.047
6 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.16
7 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.19
(b) Asymmetric overlap of URLs.
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 0.55 0.59 0.72 0.58 0.54 0.51
2 0.44 0.58 0.75 0.48 0.55 0.48 min.(S) = 0.155
3 0.34 0.41 0.76 0.42 0.42 0.39 mean.(S) = 0.496
4 0.15 0.20 0.29 0.23 0.22 0.18 max.(S) = 0.767
5 0.41 0.43 0.53 0.76 0.52 0.46 stdev.(S) = 0.158
6 0.41 0.52 0.56 0.76 0.56 0.53
7 0.46 0.54 0.62 0.77 0.59 0.63
(c) Asymmetric overlap of domains.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250656.t003
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Fig 7. Consistent network structure over time. Network diagrams of the top five communities across the six remaining weeks. Each figure
is oriented such that the left-wing cluster is on the left and the right-wing cluster is on the right. In each case node colour signifies community
membership and size is proportional to the square root of total share count. Communities are labelled 1 − 5 in decreasing order of size, and
colored blue, yellow, green, red and purple respectively. Node placement is determined by the Python implementation of the ForceAtlas2
algorithm [50].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250656.g007
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σ = 2.10%; URLs: mean 70.3%, min. 66.6%, max. 73.2%, σ = 6.54%; domains: mean 29.8%,
min. 27.3%, max. 31.5%, σ = 4.21%). While web domains exhibit the most stability between
weeks, URLs exhibit the least stability and users fall between these two extremes.
To confirm that the persistent two-cluster network structures seen in Fig 7 are polarised
along the same left-right political and environmentalist-sceptic ideological axes as that seen for
Week 4 (see Fig 5), the domain bias codings were applied to the networks created for Weeks 1-
3 and 5-7 (S6 and S7 Figs in S1 File). Furthermore, average biases were calculated for all com-
munities in each week in Fig 8. Trends in polarisation over time are shown as network aver-
ages for political and climate change biases, alongside the community averages, in Fig 8. In
most weeks, the whole-network average shows mild left-wing and environmentalist bias.
Week 5 shows (for the only time across the seven-week period) a large neutral community.
Supporting the visual evidence seen in S6 and S7 Figs in S1 File, and the community-level bias
scores in Fig 8, these findings show that the polarised network structure observed in Week 4 is
persistent and is not an artefact of the increase in activity in the climate change conversation
despite the turnover in users, source domains and shared articles.
Discussion
This paper presents an analysis of digital media sharing behaviour around the contested issue
of climate change. Our analysis looks at the network structure formed by users sharing web
articles related to climate change, combining network analysis with computational and human
text analyses to identify and characterise communities of users and the articles/sources they
Fig 8. Levels of political and climate change bias over the course of the seven week study period. These are measured as the
mean coded bias of domains weighted by total shares (see Ideological coding of source domains). Bias in each of the five largest
communities are represented by the scatter points in each week, and the bias across the whole network is given by the lines. The
colour of the community points is consistent with other figures. In most weeks, the average network bias is left of centre and
more environmentalist than sceptic. This trend continues to the individual communities, with the majority being left-wing and
environmentalist.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250656.g008
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share. The aim is to understand how people engage with, and share online media content
about climate change on social media (specifically Twitter).
We have found that amongst the communities of shared URLs, right-wing and climate
sceptic views are strongly correlated, as are left-wing and environmentalist views. This correla-
tion has been observed in individuals before using survey-based methods (e.g. [3, 51, 52]). Our
study shows that the association extends to media outlets, specifically to the content produced
by a large set of online news providers (Fig 4), and is a major feature of how online content is
shared. Recent work by Hornsey et al. [52] suggests that the scepticism-conservatism link may
be strongest in the US. This finding is supported here, where we observe two large communi-
ties based mainly on US sources; one more left-wing and environmentalist, the other more
right-wing and sceptic. Although we did not examine where the users in our dataset were
located geographically, the dominance of US sources in two of the communities, and of UK
sources in one of the communities, suggests that these communities are largely formed around
users from those countries. Our overall focus on English-language tweets and media content,
plus large numbers of Twitter users in these countries (nearly 15% of online US adults used
Twitter in 2017 [12]), are consistent with this conjecture.
In this study we find two levels of community structure. At the highest level, there is polari-
sation and segregation with a large left-wing/environmentalist grouping and a smaller right-
wing/sceptic grouping clearly visible in the sharing network after the application of the force-
directed layout algorithm. Within the left-wing/environmentalist group, algorithmic commu-
nity detection finds (typically) four smaller groupings, characterised by further analysis as
above. It is interesting to note that the right-wing/climate sceptic group is more densely con-
nected internally than the left-wing/environmentalist group (Student’s t-test applied to average
clustering coefficients of all left-wing and right-wing communities in Figs 3 and 7, with clus-
tering coefficients calculated in Gephi using Latapy’s algorithm [53], p = 0.019). This finding
echoes the observation by Colleoni et al. [54] that in the US, active Republicans exhibit greater
levels of homophily than Democrats in their patterns of interaction on Twitter.
The temporal analysis presented above gives confidence that the polarised network struc-
ture is robust over time, despite turnover in the user populations, sets of shared articles and
news sources. We studied similarity between the sets of users, URLs and domains across the
seven weeks, as well as the proportion of users, URLs and domains appearing only in the
exceptional Week 4 (in which climate change was the subject of a mainstream news event
when President Trump announced the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement). This major
event substantially increased the volume of social media messages related to climate change
and drew in an increased number of new users, who shared a greater number of articles from a
greater number of online information sources. Thus we observed network structure and com-
position in both ‘normal operation’ as well as in an unusual state of high activity, showing the
typical level of week-to-week volatility as well as the substantial change under the influence of
the disruptive mainstream news event. At all times, including the disruptive event, the polar-
ised network structure remains strong and clearly visible, despite substantial changes in its
constituent parts (users and articles). As such, we conclude that the broad topological features
visible in Figs 3 and 7 are stable over the seven-week duration of our dataset. Similarly, we
find that the association of left-wing/environmentalist views, and of right-wing/sceptic views,
are persistent, as shown in Fig 5a and 5b, S6 and S7 Figs in S1 File. Future study may find it
fruitful to examine whether such stability exists for other online networks or other politicised
discussions.
The similarity statistics in Table 3 suggest a general trend for a small proportion of the
users, URLs and domains to persist across weeks while others appear only sporadically. In the
URL case, the comparatively low levels of similarity are not surprising as news articles are
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quickly superseded by new facts and perspectives. Among the users and domains, the evidence
suggests the network has a stable core with an unstable periphery. Over the seven weeks stud-
ied, a number of websites establish themselves as critical to the flow of information around cli-
mate change, either as news sources (such as The Guardian or Breitbart) or as conduits for
personal opinions (such as Twitter and Wordpress). Many other sites are peripheral to the
news-sharing network of climate change, appearing sporadically with a lower frequency of
usage. This paper has deliberately avoided studying users as individuals, but it seems reason-
able to expect a core group of committed and strongly interested people who regularly share
information about climate change, with others who contribute less frequently or only when
motivated by external factors. Considering this user behaviour in the context of the persistent
network structure we have observed, it appears that the revealed polarisation is a feature of the
system as a whole and not caused by specific events or users.
This article illuminates several new dimensions of the media debate around environmental
politics and climate change. The findings complement previous studies that have shown cli-
mate-related echo chambers exist in direct user-user interactions (e.g. [18, 27]) by showing
that similar structures also characterise patterns of information-sharing. The Twitter messages
that form the sharing network studied here reflect a mechanism of news promotion and active
attempts to inform others, which is not always the case in direct personal interactions. We also
capture a vital additional element by exploring the network topology over time and demon-
strating that the polarised structure persists, even when there is a disruptive mainstream news
event. In addition, we have shown a strong correlation between political and climate-related
ideological biases in news production and consumption, with associations between left-wing/
environmental and right-wing/sceptic positions. This widens the scope of previous studies of
mainstream news media (e.g. [51]) to include the increasingly important online news media.
When looked at in isolation, several domains appear to be coded with more of a left-wing,
environmentalist bias than would be expected by domain knowledge experts. Typically neutral
sites, such as Bloomberg, are reported as left-wing and environmentalist primarily through the
lenses they use to cover the specific topic of climate change. Other domains, such as the Daily
Caller, may have been poorly represented by the content sampling process as factual and scien-
tific extracts taken without surrounding challenging context were considered as supporting
the scientific consensus. This “good faith” on the part of the coders returns a particularly erro-
neous response for Watts Up With That, a prominent blog in the sceptical community. Many
of their articles present quotations from public figures and scientific papers in addition to their
own commentary that frequently challenges the framing, which are contextual clues that may
be unavailable to the coders. The last explanation for possible misclassification of certain
domains identified in this exercise is the reposting of content from other sources. Investigation
of the articles coded from Fox News found that three of the five articles were from Associated
Press sources, which may present a different editorial bias to Fox News original content. The
choice of which content to repost from other sources is an important editorial decision and as
such we believe this inclusion has not adversely affected our findings.
Future work in this area could further examine the ties between political and environmental
opinions. This study used human coders to detect biases from article content. While this
approach was successful, it carries substantial costs which make it hard to operate for large
datasets. It could be argued that our use of subjective human grading is a limitation in our
analysis, but it is a necessary compromise given the inherently subjective nature of political
and environmental beliefs and the current lack of objective tools for analysing such complex
interpretations in large quantities of data. An automated classifier for these biases would
require significant work for its creation (using a blend of machine learning and natural lan-
guage processing), but would support future large-scale studies, a necessary step given the
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ever-increasing volume of online content. Another research question concerns whether the
patterns observed on Twitter extend to other online platforms. We studied Twitter due to its
prominent role as a means for users to find news stories [55] and its frequent usage as a plat-
form for lively political debates in which strangers can interact. If suitable datasets could be
obtained, it would be possible to apply similar methods to other popular sites such as Facebook
and Reddit; however, privacy restrictions prevent research on many social media platforms.
Finally, one further question that is not addressed here is downstream exposure to shared con-
tent, that is, who sees the articles that are shared by Twitter users? It is probable that the users
captured in our dataset, that select and share online articles about climate change through
Twitter, act as ‘opinion leaders’ (following the long-established two-step flow model of Katz
and Lazarsfeld [56]), locating new information about the topic and disseminating it to their
followers. Measuring the volume of downstream views and retweet rates would answer impor-
tant questions about which messages are more effective when shared on social media. One key
question is the extent to which polarisation exists in this secondary consumption of climate
change media, or whether network effects mitigate polarisation by capturing views from both
sides.
Any gathering of data from online social networks requires careful consideration of the
biases that it may introduce. The users of online platforms are a different distribution of people
than the general population: they tend to be younger, more wealthy and better educated [57].
Our sampling on keywords means that we will capture users who are more engaged with the
topic of climate change, and moreover are significantly invested enough to share information
with their followers. As such we are considering a highly-motivated sample of a certain part of
society, but this is what will be visible to many users when they visit Twitter. This sampling
also explains the difference from Global Warming’s Six Americas [1] that we observe, as only
the “alarmed” and “dismissive” types are likely to be invested enough to be captured. The work
of Williams et al. [18] support this as their coding of Twitter users found only the extreme
environmentalists and sceptics. Our keywords were chosen to capture as much of the English
language components of the climate change conversation online, but the observed structures
may vary in other languages. These factors should be considered in any analysis of social
media data but we do not believe that they affect the strength of our findings in any way.
This work demonstrates that media communication of information around climate change
faces many challenges in the age of social media. Users return to the same trusted sources for
information even when presented with new contexts, and any attempts to attract new reader-
ships need to consider this behaviour. Understanding how these trusted ties form will be key
to combating the spread of misinformation that currently challenges online social networks
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